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Abstract 
 
The article analyses the nowadays advancement of the European 
Union to the East of the continent through the prism of the gradual 
shift of its geopolitical, geoeconomic and institutional frontiers that 
includes four fundamental components: basic stabilization and de-
mocratization, economic association and, eventually, institutional 
accession of the former “socialist countries” to the EU. We suggest 
the Wider Europe’s strategy to be the prolongation of the EU policy 
of “deliberate uncertainty” carried out regarding the CIS European 
countries. 
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“The delimitation of Europe requires 
studying geography, taking into account 
history and adopting a political decision”   
Hubert Védrine,  French Foreign Minister
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The consistent geopolitical transformation of the Old continent is 
not reduced to the EU’s absorbing its closest Eastern and North 
Eastern periphery. The outsiders of the present enlargement process 
Bulgaria and Romania are to join the EU in 2007. The rest of the 
Balkan countries will be granted the possibility to join the European 
Union within the Stabilization and Association process initiated in 
1999. Without taking into consideration the vague future prospects 
of Turkey, the final EU territorial configuration will depend on the 
probable membership of seven European CIS states (Moldavia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan), which meet the basic geographical criterion.  
 
Where is the final point of the European Union’s enlargement to the 
East? Is it possible to determine this boundary? Showing no desire 
to find the final answer the European Commission put forward the 
Wider Europe strategy in March 2003. This policy covers new 
Eastern neighbour states of the enlarged Union (Belarus, Moldavia 
and Ukraine), the Russian Federation as well as the South Mediter-
ranean countries. Brussels finds it workable to turn the existing “arc 
of instability” on the EU Southern and Eastern borders into a “ring 
of friends” through gradual applying the tools of close association 
with every neighbour state in accordance with its meeting the de-
termined criteria of rapprochement. Thus, the delimitation between 
the Wider Union and Wider Europe will coincide with the border-
line of the transient Commonwealth of Independent States turning 
Ukraine, Moldavia and Belarus into common “close neighbour-
hood” of Russia and the European Union.  
                                                 
1   On the eve of the European Council Meeting in Helsinki, December 1999. Poselsky: The frontiers of Europe 53 
The author of this article suggests viewing the nowadays advance-
ment of the European West to the East of the continent through the 
prism of the gradual shift of its geopolitical, geoeconomic, institu-
tional and political frontiers. We believe that the process of “com-
ing back to Europe” for the former hostages of the “socialist camp” 
includes four fundamental components: basic stabilization and de-
mocratization, economic association and, eventually, institutional 
accession to the EU. The European Union enlargement itself goes 
through a number of particular stages conditioned by the procedural 
rules in force, the degree of readiness of the applicant states along 
with the requirements for the “deepening” of the integration process 
and the accommodation of interests of the member states.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The first section analyses the 
bases and stages of the current unification of the Continent. The 
second examines a new proximity policy of the EU towards its 
neighbours (creation of the Wider Europe). 
 
 
2.  Stages and bases of the current unification process on the 
continent 
 
Contemporary move to unite Europe within a single political and 
economic community is often regarded as the latest geopolitical 
“expansion of the West” or, vice versa, a civilizational “European 
homecoming”. We believe that it is worthwhile defining the current 
advancement of the European Union to the East of the continent as 
the process of voluntarily assuming all the Western norms and val-
ues by the countries of the former Eastern Europe, which facilitates 
their economic integration as well as further accession to the Euro-
pean Community. Regarding all this approaching the EU contains 
four interconnected stages: stabilization, democratization, the estab-
lishment of association and the acquiring of membership. 
 
 
2.1 Stabilization 
 
Internal territorial integrity and friendly relations with country 
neighbours form the reliable basis for democratic and market trans-
formations in each post-communist state. However, the stabilization 54  European Political Economy Review  
 
is not reduced to eliminating military conflict threat or hedging par-
ticular regions (“hard” threats). It presupposes efficient state man-
agement which provides for effective combating organized crime 
and corruption inside the country, reliable border controlling and 
preventing illegal emigration of its citizens to other countries 
(“weak” threats). The upsurge of national conflicts in Yugoslavia 
and the USSR, the considerable number of national minorities in 
Central European countries, overall threat of “weak” risks assigned 
the stabilization with the prominent role in Western Europe. In 
practice, the EU initiated concluding the Stability Pact for Central 
Eastern (1995) and South Eastern Europe (1999). 
 
Nowadays basic stabilization tasks are pressing for solution in the 
Transcaucasian states (undetermined status for Abkhazia, Nagorny 
Karabakh and Southern Osetia), in the Russian Federation (the war 
in Chechnya), in Serbia and Montenegro (the future for Kosovo and 
Montenegro), in Moldova (the problem of the Transdniestr region), 
whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina have succeeded in stabilization 
under the protectorate of the international community.  
 
 
2.2 Democratization 
 
The establishment of the sustainable democracy and the rule of law 
throughout the former communist regimes can be analysed within 
three stages: 1) liberalization; 2) transition; 3) democratic consoli-
dation (Kubicek 2003: 21). In other words, democratization is the 
process of shifting geopolitical boundaries of the European political 
area
2. According to the report “Nations in Transit 2003” produced 
by American non-governmental organization “Freedom House”, all 
Central and South East European states (except Bosnia and Herze-
govina) have already reached the level of consolidated or partially 
consolidated democracy, while the CIS European countries remain 
transitional or autocratic regimes (see Table 1)
3. From its own part, 
                                                 
2  If proceed from the statement that any geopolitical community is the space for   
implementing some political project, then geopolitical Europe can be drawn as 
a space for market economy and law-governed state actual functioning. See 
Foucher (1993: 15). 
3    A Democratisation score (DEM) is an average of an electoral process, 
development of civil society, independent media and governance ratings. A Poselsky: The frontiers of Europe 55 
the EU introduced regional financial aid programmes (PHARE, 
TACIS, CARDS), which aim at promoting faster stabilization and 
democratization of post-communist states.   
 
 
Table 1: Steps of democratization  
 
Level of democratization  Post-communist States  DEM  ROL 
Consolidated democracies  Poland  
Slovenia 
Hungary 
Slovakia 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
Latvia  
Czech republic 
1,63 
1,75 
1,81 
1,81 
1,88 
1.94 
1,94 
2,00 
2,00 
1,88 
2,25 
2,63 
2,63 
2,13 
2,88 
3,00 
Democracies  
(some consolidation) 
 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Croatia 
Serbia and Montenegro 
Albania 
Macedonia 
3,13 
3,25 
3,44 
3,50 
3,94 
3,94 
3,88 
4,38 
4,50 
4,63 
4,63 
5,00 
Transitional (hybrid) re-
gimes 
Bosnia  
Moldova  
Ukraine 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Russia 
4,31 
4,38 
4,50 
4,69 
4,69 
4,88 
5,00 
5,38 
5,13 
5,38 
5,13 
5,13 
Autocracies Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
5,31 
6,63 
5,75 
6,13 
 
 
                                                                                                               
Rule of law score (ROL) bases on average of constitutional, legislative, judicial 
framework and corruption ratings. “Freedom House” determines the figures for 
countries at a 7-point scale, where 1 corresponds to “consolidated democracies”, 
3 to “democracies with some consolidation”, 4 to “transitional governments or 
hybrid regimes, 5 to autocracies, 7 to “consolidated autocracies”. The 
abovementioned rankings reflect the state of democratic development of post-
communist countries for 2002. See www.freedomhouse.org 
 56  European Political Economy Review  
 
2.3.  Association partnership 
 
The association status based on article 310 of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community (TEC) embraces various forms of as-
sociated partnership which are carried out through specially estab-
lished bodies (Councils, committees associations/partnerships) and 
mainly deal with promoting various forms of economic integration: 
joining the Single Market, setting up the Customs Union or a free 
trade zone with the EU (see Table 2). Given all this, Partnership and 
Cooperation agreements (PCA) with the CIS states should be con-
sidered the lowest level of association, which points out only the 
possibility to set up a free trade zone with the Russian Federation, 
Moldova and Ukraine in future (depending on the realization of 
economic reforms in these countries). On the whole the Association 
agreements concluded by the EU can be fairly related to the shift of 
its geoeconomic borders. Nowadays, as is the case with geopolitical 
Europe, the Eastern geoeconomic boundary of the European Com-
munity coincides with the Western border of the CIS.  
 
 
Table 2. Steps of economic integration of the European periphery 
 
Level of            
economic          
integration 
State-
participants 
(beyond EU-
25) 
Date of            
signing the 
association 
agreement  
Date of            
application 
Characteristic features            
and commentaries 
New member  
states 
(Since 
1.05.2004) 
Malta 
Cyprus 
 
 
05.12.1970 
19.12.1972 
 
 
16.07.1990 
03.07.1990 
 
 
Malta, Cyprus: Concluding 
Association agreements, 
which envisage a probable 
two-stage establishment of the 
Customs Union (in both cases 
pending the negotiations on 
accession, with the Customs 
Union on manufactured goods 
being not realized) 
  Poland 
Hungary 
Czech rep. 
Slovakia 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
Slovenia 
16.12.1991 
16.12.1991 
06.10.1993 
06.10.1993 
12.06.1995 
12.06.1995 
12.06.1995 
10.06.1996 
05.04.1994 
31.03.1994 
17.01.1996 
27.06.1995 
24.11.1995 
08.12.1995 
03.10.1995 
10.06.1996 
CCEE: Concluding “European 
agreements”, which stipulate 
an asymmetrical transition to 
free manufactured goods trade 
zones, partial liberalization of 
three other freedoms 
Other spheres: political dia-
logue, introduction of a visa-
free regime Poselsky: The frontiers of Europe 57 
 
Level of            
economic          
integration 
State-
participants 
(beyond EU-
25) 
Date of            
signing the 
association 
agreement  
Date of            
application 
Characteristic features            
and commentaries 
European 
Economic 
Area 
 
Norway 
Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
02.05.1992 
 
  Access to the EU common 
market through free movement 
of manufactured goods, peo-
ple, services and capitals 
(without expansion to agricul-
ture and Customs regime of 
the third world countries). 
Other spheres: joining the EU 
foreign policy declarations, 
Norway and Iceland’s joining 
the Shengen area 
Customs           
Union 
Turkey 
 
12.09.1963 14.04.1987 Customs  Union  introduction 
since 1.01.1996 regarding 
manufactured goods 
Other spheres: political dia-
logue, maintaining the visa re-
gime 
Free trade 
zone 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
22.07.1972 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Switzerland: the 1972 funda-
mental agreement on free ex-
change of goods was supple-
mented by a number of other 
sector agreements, in particu-
lar, by the 1999 agreement on 
free movement of people 
  Romania 
Bulgaria 
08.02.1993 
01.03.1993 
22.06.1995 
14.12.1995 
Romania, Bulgaria: European 
associated partnership like for 
other CCEE, delayed transi-
tion to a visa-free regime 
Free trade 
zone in the 
making 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
Albania 
Serbia-
Montenegro 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
29.10.2001 
09.04.2001 
 
negotiations 
being             
conducted 
21.02.2003  Progressive conclusion of Sta-
bilization and Association 
agreements, which stipulate an 
asymmetrical transition to free 
trade zones;  
The EU’s implementation of 
substantial trade preferences 
for the countries of the region 
starting with late 2000 
Other spheres: arranging po-
litical dialogue, maintaining 
the visa regime (excluding 
Croatia) 
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2.4.  Institutional accession 
 
Given the complexity and significance of the EU accession proce-
dure, it may take from 3-4 years (as did for example Finland and 
Sweden) up to 10 years and more (for the countries involved in the 
current enlargement). The EU Council adopts all decisions on 
enlargement under the unanimity rule, which grants every member-
state the right to veto the candidature of this or that country or, at 
least, to efficiently block various stages of the accession procedure. 
In this respect one should be aware of the importance of the EU 
Council’s acknowledgement of the prospective membership for an 
applicant country, though it is not institutionally required. As is 
known, the accession procedure grounds, first of all, on current arti-
cle 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (former article 237 of 
the TEC), which stipulates three basic requirements established for 
applicant-state 
 
 
To be a European state geographically  
 
Despite lengthy debates on borders on the European continent, po-
litical geography clearly defines the essence of “a European state” 
with particular reservations as to only two Eurasian states such as 
Turkey, 3 % of whose territory is in Europe and the rest in Asia, and 
the Russian Federation, which can arbitrarily be divided into Euro-
pean and Asian parts. The South Mediterranean states are uncondi-
tionally referred to as African and Asian countries, while fifteen 
former republics of the Soviet Union split into new European (Bal-
tic states, Transcaucasian states, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) and 
Asian (Central Asian states) states
4.  
                                                 
4  As was impartially stated by Spanish politologist Débora Miralles (2002), the 
Southern Mediterranean could aspire to join the EU only on condition of 
removing the requirement of geographical belonging to Europe from Article 49 
of the EU Treaty. These fundamental realia of political geography, however, do 
not prevent some West European politicians from putting the European 
countries of the CIS in the same line as some countries of Maghreb or the 
Middle East. For instance, one of the leaders of the German Christian 
Democrats Michael Gloss claimed in Bundestag that “Turkey’s joining the EU 
will set a precedent for such states as Morocco and Ukraine”, “Handelsblatt” of 
December 4, 2002. In his turn, former Minister and Deputy of the European Poselsky: The frontiers of Europe 59 
Following the inconsistency with the basic geographic criterion, the 
EEC Council of Ministers rejected Morocco’s application (1987). In 
its Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours” the European Commission confirmed the impossibility 
of accession to the EU for all its “non-European Mediterranean 
partners” along with the probable accession prospects for such 
“European states” on the East of Europe that “have clearly ex-
pressed their wish to join the Union”.  
   
 
To strive for the EU membership 
 
The obvious character of the statement covers the fundamental 
principle of voluntary and democratic structure of the European 
Community, which neither poses any threats to its neighbours nor 
plots any territorial expansion. The European Union respects the 
sovereign right of such states as Iceland, Switzerland or Russia to 
remain aloof from the European integration process. Thus, the EU 
membership prerequisite is a clearly shaped national strategy of in-
tegration to the EU as well as an institutionally required application 
of a European state.  
 
 
To be a sustainable democracy  
 
General Franco’s authoritative regime was the first to make certain 
that the European Community is not only a project of economic in-
tegration but also a union of democratic nations when it applied for 
association with the EEC in 1962. Lengthy negotiations resulted 
only in Spain’s signing a trade preferential agreement in 1970. Its 
further approaching the Community was distinctly conditioned by 
its transition to democracy. At the same time, the establishment of 
military dictatorship in Greece in 1967 made the European Com-
                                                                                                               
Parliament from France Alain Lamassoure  (2003: 39) believes that 
incompliance with the geographical criterion brought about the recognition of 
the candidature of Turkey and puts the issue of probable EU membership for 
Ukrainem Moldova, Morocco, Russia and Israel on the agenda. 
 60  European Political Economy Review  
 
mission suspend the Association Agreement with this country. 
However, democratic reforms in Greece, Portugal and Spain in 
1974-1975 assisted their further integration to the EEC. In the con-
text of the EU enlargement of Central and East European states the 
1993 Copenhagen Council confirmed the existence of stable democ-
ratic institutions as the basic accession criterion. The 1996-1997 
Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference amended article 49 of 
the Treaty on the EU that now envisages that “any European state, 
which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) (principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, and the rule of law), may apply to become a member of the 
Union”. Within the frameworks of meeting the political criteria, the 
EU obliged the applicant states from the East of Europe to guaran-
tee the rights of their national minorities and maintain neighbourly 
relations in the region.  
 
The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 consolidated two 
more important accession criteria: efficient market economy ready 
to compete at the EU domestic market; the ability to acquire the ac-
quis in corpora. 
 
 
To be an efficient market economy 
 
Conformity with the basic principles of market economy automati-
cally arose from the necessity of profound convergence of the 
member states’ economies within the “Common market”. Mean-
while, as was proved by the accession of Greece, Spain and Portu-
gal, given the current enlargement of the EU on Central European 
countries and preplanned absorbing the Balkan states even consid-
erable recess in social and economic development cannot obstruct 
the EU membership, it can only postpone it. In other words, the ef-
ficiency of national market mechanisms rather than current eco-
nomic wealth is taken into account while considering the economic 
state of an applicant-country (a healthy rather than wealthy criteria). 
The pre-accession level of economic integration to the European 
Union is not specified either, which, at least theoretically, obviates 
the necessity to conclude a preliminary Association agreement with 
the EU for a potential applicant-state. 
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To be concordant with and able to adopt the acquis 
 
The Community put forward the requirement of introducing the ag-
gregate acquis into national legislation of an applicant-country dur-
ing the first enlargement on Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark 
(1973). It would not be an exaggeration to view the general acces-
sion procedure as the process of adopting the acquis by an appli-
cant-state that sets the subject for accession negotiations and that all 
is fixed in an Accession treaty in detail. The approaching of legisla-
tion of post-communist countries to the EU legislation actually 
started at the stages of stabilization and democratization, continued 
at the stage of implementing Association agreements and will con-
tinue after the official accession date till the full completion of tran-
sition periods envisaged by the Accession treaty. Thus, satisfying 
this criterion goes far beyond initial “applicant” attempts of a coun-
try and can be assessed by its juridical and administrative capability 
to meet the commitments made. Observing this prerequisite does 
not cover, however, an applicant-state’s probable “euro sceptical” 
view of goals and final political structure of the Union, which 
means the consent to share the contemporary acquis, and not neces-
sarily still indeterminate finalité politique. To claim the opposite 
would mean to deny the accession of Great Britain and the Scandi-
navian countries. 
 
Nonetheless, institutional approval of these five prerequisites to-
gether with principles of their implementation (general non-
discrimination and differentiation of applicant states corresponding 
to their progress) does not eliminate certain political and juridical 
vagueness of the accession procedure. The thing is that the effective 
accession criteria are only some kind of operational “rules of game” 
that do not impose certain legal obligations on member states (that 
is to say, the decisions in this sphere are beyond the European Court 
jurisdiction) relevant to the way of interpreting appeals for member-
ship from other European countries. The issue of the EU member-
ship provides the European candidate states with an opportunity, but 
not with a right to join the European Union (Torreblanca, 2003). 
Hence, it seems reasonable to add the abovementioned five-
accession criteria with one more significant requirement to a candi-
date country: 
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To have the Community’s consent to accession 
 
In addition to readiness criteria to be met by a candidate country it 
is essential to consider the Union’s overall capacity to enlarge as 
well as the positions and interests of particular member states. 
Every enlargement of six basic countries’ core brought about some 
discord between the Community members splitting them into “euro-
optimists” and “euro-sceptics”, into investors and users of European 
funds, into liberalists and governmentalists, into small and great 
states, into “the Mediterranean and East European lobbies”, etc. 
However, it will be a mistake to view the enlargement process as 
the one posing threats to the integrity and effectiveness of the Euro-
pean integration project because starting with the initial absorption 
of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark and finishing with the recent 
accession of ten countries the enlargement prospect has always been 
“a necessary catalyst for long-overdue reforms”
5 within the Com-
munity. This statement proved to be the most striking in the current 
process of the EU enlargement that enhanced the realisation of the 
long-standing idea of establishing a political union.  
 
Positioning the member states with regard to the enlargement proc-
ess is not reduced only to the preservation of the acquis but is also 
illustrated by a number of other factors, namely: geographical and 
historical proximity of a candidate country, loss of some financial 
advantages, disturbance of the Union’s internal political balance as 
well as traditional strategic and foreign policy considerations. Ger-
many’s consistent support of issuing the EU membership for Cen-
tral and East European countries arises from viewing the enlarge-
ment process as a chance to set up a new European federation (Jo-
schka Fischer’s approach), special close relations with the countries 
of the region and substantial economic advantages. Great Britain 
and Denmark backed up rapid expansion to Central and East Euro-
pean countries mainly reckoning that the achieved differentiation 
level inside the Union could put an end to political projects of its 
further federalisation. Meanwhile, France expressed the greatest 
number of apprehensions and doubts related to the accession of 
                                                 
5   According to the exact expression of British researcher Heather Grabbe. 
International Herald Tribune, June 13, 2003. 
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Central and East European countries under the pressure of a range 
of factors, namely: estimation of enlargement as potential threat to 
the idea of  “Europe-puissance”; fear of losing its considerable po-
litical position in a wider Europe; traditional care for the Southern 
Mediterranean. From this point of view such small and relatively 
prosperous countries as Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia (which 
could also expect some member states to lobby their candidacy) a 
priori find it much easier to join the EU than, for instance, Turkey 
or Ukraine the accession of which could brought about substantial 
redirection of European budget money. 
 
It is also worth mentioning the impact the traditional regional links 
and geographical realia have on the EU enlargement process. It 
would have been problematic to carry out, for instance, the 1997 
first “Luxembourg” project of enlargement to the East, which drew 
the demarcation line of the Community separating Czech Republic 
from Slovakia as well as upsetting political and economic integrity 
of the Baltic countries. Issuing membership to Romania brings 
Moldova closer to the European Union and probable accession of 
Turkey will attract the Union’s attention to the Transcaucasian re-
gion. Taking into account the EU new neighbours (countries of 
“joint periphery”) it is also worth considering the Russian Federa-
tion factor both at level of the EU-Russia relations and at the level 
of relations and commitments within the former Soviet Union space.  
 
 
3.   Wider Europe or how to enlarge the European Union with-
out shifting its institutional borders 
 
The Wider Europe strategy (the WES) was confirmed by the Coun-
cil of the EU in June 2003 on the basis of the March Communica-
tion from the European Commission “Wider Europe – Neighbour-
hood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and South-
ern Neighbours”
6. In practice the formula “everything except insti-
tutions” grants the chances for reinforced economic integration 
(gradual access to the Union’s domestic market); for enhanced po-
litical dialogue; wider application of visa-free regime; close coop-
                                                 
6  COM (2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003,  
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf 64  European Political Economy Review  
 
eration on preventing and combating conflicts and crises; on judi-
cial, domestic policy and legal assistance; on trans-boundary and 
regional cooperation; transport; energy; telecommunications net-
works; culture; research area; education and environmental protec-
tion; implementation of a new financial instrument of neighbour-
hood. 
 
By its juridical and practical aspects the WES fits the frames of the 
operating association institution and according to the intentions of 
its founders it is to guarantee the integrity and consistency of the 
Wider EU policy regarding its neighbour countries while being “an 
acceptable alternative for membership” for the countries (Wallace, 
2003). Strategically, the neighbourhood initiative puts an “ex-
tremely ambitious” task for itself to bring the EU relations with its 
Southern and Eastern peripheries to the level of relations in the 
European economic area. In other words, the EU neighbour coun-
tries can join the European geoeconomic space in exchange for 
adopting the basic values of geopolitical Europe and a considerable 
share of the acquis.  
 
Along with this the WES grounds on a differential and step-by-step 
approach following which every neighbour country will be offered 
an individual Action Plan, and in compliance with this the integra-
tion to the EU domestic market will be carried out taking into ac-
count the fulfilment of the Action Plan and the established general 
accession criteria. The suggested scheme follows the three-
componential rapprochement formula that the EU successfully ap-
plied to the Central European countries (annual monitoring carried 
out by the Commission, the EU Action Plans and national Pro-
grammes of their realisation adopted by neighbour countries) with 
the significant distinction that the aim is profound association rather 
than membership. Taking into account those difficulties and mutual 
frustration that characterise the EU current relations with Ukraine, 
Moldova and the majority of the Southern Mediterranean the 
neighbourhood concept makes an important step forward because it 
fills the relations with actual and binding sense for both sides.  
 
At the same time the WES calls for deeper analysis in the context of 
global postcommunist evolution of the continent. Following the 
collapse of communist regimes some European politicians and Poselsky: The frontiers of Europe 65 
experts supported either the establishment of a pan-european 
confederation (F. Mitterrand, Jacques Delors, the 1998 Report of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) or the 
establishment of a special membership status on the basis of flexible 
and partial implementation of the acquis  (Jacques Attali, Charles 
Grant). Instead of the current and long-term enlargement process 
such a scenario would foster institutional and geopolitical 
adjustment of new East European democracies to the European 
Union. The associated membership formula could embrace all 
European countries that meet the democracy criterion but either 
temporarily fail to meet other criteria or do not strive for full 
membership (the CIS European countries, the Balkan countries, the 
Common Economic Area, Swtzerland, Turkey).  
 
The suggested neighbourhood concept grounds on opposite 
fundamental, i.e. gradual economic integration that not only 
remains within the frames of the existing institution of association, 
but also spreads over non-european neighbour countries of the EU.  
The WES contradicts, therefore, the proclaimed paradigm of a One 
Europe because it regards East European countries not as potential 
candidates for membership that can join the EU on condition of 
meeting the accession criteria, but as close foreign-policy partners 
of the Union. For lack of new institutional mechanisms it would be 
appropriate to spread the integration strategy, which is gradual, full-
fledged and conditioned by actual integration results, over those 
East European countries that expressed their strive for membership 
following the pattern of the stabilisation and association process 
carried out by Brussels in the West Balkan countries. In 
consequence, the concept of Wider Europe can be accounted in 
Ukraine and Moldova as a strategy of constraining the integration 
intentions of these countries rather than an effective way of their 
approaching the European Union. 
 
It seems the most appropriate to consider the WES to be the prolon-
gation of the EU policy of “deliberate uncertainty” carried out re-
garding the CIS European countries. Despite the fact that some pre-
sent leaders of the European Commission and some member states 
repeatedly expressed the vision of an “ideal Europe” without its 
Eastern part, the neighbourhood concept never excludes the possi-
bility for East European countries to be issued the prospective 66  European Political Economy Review  
 
membership. As Prodi admitted “so whatever our proximity policy 
is or will be no European state that complies with the Copenhagen 
criteria ... will be denied this prospect” (Prodi, 2002). On the con-
trary, the WES and probable neighbourhood agreements can be-
come an effective means of reaching the aim because they offer 
even more (full access to the EU domestic market) than Association 
agreements with the CEECs that envisaged only setting up free 
trade zones with the EU.        
 
In practice the WES includes two groups of neighbour European 
countries of the EU:    
•  Countries of “common periphery” striving for EU membership;  
•  Russian Federation and countries striving for the close union 
with Russia 
 
 
3.1  Countries of “common periphery” 
   
The wait-and-see attitude the European Union demonstrates to the 
East European countries that since now on constitute “common 
close neighbourhood” for the Wider Union and the Russian Federa-
tion dooms the current East European policy of the EU to a concep-
tual failure. In other words, the European economic area model, to 
which the WES orients, does not strategically correspond to the new 
Eastern periphery of the Community. It is obvious that these East 
European countries have only two possible scenarios for develop-
ment, i.e. actual democratic and market reforms and gradual institu-
tional integration to the EU resulting from democratic forces’ com-
ing to power; further “declarative europeanisation” (Wolczuk, 
2003) and rapprochement between them and Russia in case the cur-
rent authorities in the countries do not qualitatively transform.  
 
At the same time, we regard as unlikely the scenario by which non 
candidate East European countries acquire the main part of the ac-
quis and shape together with the EU the “area of welfare and com-
mon values” retaining the status of “neighbours” or “friends” rather 
than wishing to become full-fledged members of the European fam-
ily. According to the EEA functioning experience, this form of pro-
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vourable position since it compels them to acquire more and more 
elements of the acquis having no possibility to influence their adop-
tion. It is not surprising that under such conditions the majority of 
potential candidates to join the EEA found it much better to be is-
sued full EU membership (Austria, Finland, Sweden) or, at least, 
make an attempt in this respect (national referendum failures in 
Norway and Switzerland). After Norway joins the European Union, 
which is most probable, the EEA can reduce to tiny Iceland and 
Liechtenstein besides the EU countries. 
 
At present Moldova and Ukraine have stated their intention to join 
the European Union. A new leadership of Georgia stresses the 
European future for his country. Yet the authoritative regime of Lu-
kashenko together with Armenia impaired by the fight for Nagorny 
Karabakh are attracted by Russia, while Azerbaijan is close to es-
tablishing the Aliev dynasty regime under the patterns of despot-
isms set up in Central Asia. Thus, taking into account compliance 
with the first two basic criteria of membership the number of poten-
tial members of EU increases only by 2-3 countries (from pre-
planned 33 to 35-36 countries). Moreover, Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia have not solved the main tasks of basic stabilisation and 
democratisation yet, though these countries’ (or, at least, some of 
the countries’) way to sustainable democracy, law-governed state 
and efficient market economy can be overcome much faster than 
during “several decades of years”. 
 
 
3.2  “Wider” Russia  
 
As distinct from Ukraine and Moldova, “the most important 
neighbour” (Pelczynska-Nalecz in Kowal, 2002) of the European 
Union, which is the Russian Federation, would seem to “fit” the 
doctrine of Wider Europe perfectly. “As a world power situated on 
two continents”
7, Russia considers itself to be an equal strategic 
partner (of one of the poles of a bipolar world) rather than a poten-
tial EU member. Strategic partnership between the European Union 
and Russia anticipates gradual establishment of four common 
                                                 
7   See “The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy Towards the European 
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spaces (Common European Economic Space (CEES); Common 
Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; the Common Space of Ex-
ternal Security; The Common Space of Research and Education), 
launching the work of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Coun-
cil, profound energy dialogue as well as cooperation in environ-
mental realm. Though it is interesting to note that the EU-Russia re-
lations actually exceed the neighbourhood initiative and, therefore, 
are subject to neither regular monitoring carried out by the Euro-
pean Commission nor strict compliance with the adopted progress 
criteria. According to the joint Declaration of the Sankt-Peterburg 
EU-Russia Summit of May 31, 2003 the process of rapprochement 
between the Community and Russia will be carried out on the 
“equal basis” as well as on the basis of determined “specific tasks 
and mutual agreement”. 
 
One can forecast that the relations between the EU and Russia will 
develop through complex and sometimes uncompromising dialogue 
on mutual trade concessions, wider application of visa-free regime 
and foreign policy issues. There also exist serious hidden dangers 
threatening the EU-Russia strategic partnership. In contradiction 
with declared commonness of values the EU and Russia have rather 
different views on the tasks, priorities and prospects of mutual part-
nership. Despite certain achievements in economic sphere Putin’s 
Russia is far from meeting the Copenhagen criteria and pursues the 
classical foreign policy doctrine based on the priority protection of 
national interests and traditional geopolitical approach (Lynch, 
2003). In addition to considering the “internal” problem of Chech-
nya the European Union should coordinate its strategic partnership 
with Russia and the proclaimed tasks of “europeanisation” of the 
East European periphery. The matter is that Russia is definitely not 
fascinated with profound democratic and market transformation of 
new East European countries and close rapprochement between 
them and the European Union
8. Russian leadership believe that the 
former Soviet republics can move to the European Union only to-
                                                 
8  The abovementioned Strategy contains the following curious provision (Point 
1.6): “Efforts will continue to be made for … protection of Russia’s legitimate 
interests while further expanding the European Union, opposing possible 
attempts to hamper economic integration in the CIS, in partucular, through 
maintaining “special relations” with individuel countries of the Commonwealth 
to the detriment of Russia’s interests”. Poselsky: The frontiers of Europe 69 
gether with Russia, i.e. within the regional association set up and 
controlled by the Kremlin. It is remarkable that along with negotiat-
ing the establishment of the CEES with the EU Russia is simultane-
ously making attempts to establish the Common Economic Space 
with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Avoiding the penetration 
into obvious discrepancies of such a dual profound economic inte-
gration, it is worth emphasizing that the post-Soviet Russia severely 
hampers internal democratisation and stabilisation in the East of 
Europe (backing up authoritative regimes of Lukashenko and Ku-
chma, resisting Moldova and Georgia in their attempts to find solu-
tions for the Trans-Dniester and Abkhasian conflicts). Yet Belarus 
is the only country out of 6 belonging to “common periphery” that 
actually belongs to the Russian geopolitical and geoeconomic 
space. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions –  Europe as a dream for unity 
 
In his well-known lecture course delivered in 1944-1945 French 
historian Lucien Febvre characterised the European idea as “a 
dream for unity”. At dawn of the ХХІ century the dream that 
seemed unattainable for many generations of the Europeans is close 
to becoming a reality. The ideal model of a united Europe could in-
clude two or, probably, three concentric circles. The main circle 
(One Europe
9) would include 25 member states of the present 
enlarged Union, Bulgaria, Romania, the West Balkan countries, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey and the Transcaucasian countries. The 
outer circle (Wider Europe) would include European countries that 
do not strive for joining the EU institutionally as well as non-
European neighbours from the Northern Africa and Middle East. 
The Wider Europe countries would shape the Common European 
Economic Space founded on the Pan-European and Mediterranean 
free trade zone. In the course of time the probable inner circle 
(deeper Europe) would be founded on the mechanisms of enhanced 
cooperation shaped by those EU countries that would strive for 
deeper integration forms than the acquis accepted by everyone, with 
                                                 
9  See See the Copenhagen Declaration “One Europe” of December 13, 2002 on 
the occasion of concluding the accession negotiations by eight CCEE, Cyprus 
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any European state having the right to join any of the three circles 
under the conditional openness principle provided it met the set cri-
teria. 
 
As has been mentioned before, the present concept of the Wider 
Europe makes it possible for any European democracy to seek the 
EU membership. A possible rejection can be conditioned by two 
fundamental postulates: the inability of a candidate country to 
satisfy the accession criteria; the inability of the Union itself for 
such enlargement. 
 
The application of periodic monitoring and Action plans in relations 
with the East European countries enables an integral and objective 
assessment of their progressive movement towards the EU. Along 
with this, it is much more difficult to estimate the readiness of the 
Union itself, because such an analysis bases largely on subjective 
views of some member states rather than on clearly distinguished 
criteria. Nowadays some West European leaders and the European 
Commission leadership deny a-priori the possibility of the further 
enlargement of the European Community to the East European 
countries, justifying it with the necessity “to preserve the internal 
balance and cohesion of the Union” (Prodi, 2002). 
 
Such reasoning, however, brings about some questions. First, as the 
President of the European Commission stated concerning the 
current enlargement, the efficient structure of the Community 
“completely depends on the clear division of powers between 
European institutions and current procedures. It is hundreds of times 
as easy to work within the 27-member Union according to the 
majority vote principle as within the EU-15 that adopt decisions 
according to the unanimity principle” (Prodi, 2001). Granted the 
successful adoption of the draft Constitutional Treaty, the 
institutional and political structure of the European Union will 
become qualitatively renewed, which means: transition to a duel-
majority system of adopting decisions by qualified majority in the 
EU Council of Ministers
10 ; further narrowing the sphere of 
                                                 
10 As the calculations of Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgren (2003) show, the 
suggested voting scheme provides for as easy adoption of a decision by the EU 
consisting of 27 member states (from technical point of view) as it used to be Poselsky: The frontiers of Europe 71 
application of the unanimous voting procedure etc. One can assume 
that, granted the implementation of the new Constitutional Treaty 
(approximately in 2009) and its most likely further reform, the 
European Union   will be capable of expanding farther beyond 
the currently coordinated Eastern land border. Moreover, the 
probable EU enlargement to Turkey will require further reforms in 
common agricultural and structural policies, which, in turn, could 
facilitate the integration of underdeveloped East European 
countries. 
 
Second, the idea of “internal inability of the Community to enlarge” 
cannot at all be applied to Moldova and the Transcaucasian coun-
tries that are small by both size and population number. The Euro-
pean Union, which from the present 15 members (377 million peo-
ple) is planning to enlarge to 32 (500 million people) or 33 (570 
million people together with Turkey) members, is quite capable of 
absorbing Ukraine with less than 50 million population. Actually 
the real threat to the integrity and domestic political balance of the 
European Union can be posed by the probable enlargement to big-
gest country of the continent – the Russian Federation – and, to a 
less extent, to Turkey (taking into account its stable demographic 
growth). The issue of the EU prospective membership for Russia is 
not to be on the agenda of the Union until the Russian leadership 
files the application for accession. However, such a scenario seems 
to be unlikely even supposing that Russian currently weak democ-
ratic forces and civil society will manage to transform the present 
model of Putin’s “guided democracy” into a sustainable democratic 
government. The matter is that even European and democratic Rus-
sia will logically strive for remaining one of the world’s poles of in-
fluence and, accordingly, will not express desire to lose its inde-
pendence in adopting decisions and to concede a significant part of 
its sovereignty in favour of the European Union. 
                                                                                                               
done in the European Community consisting of 6 founding States. In general 
the new voting system increases the political weight of four biggest countries 
of the Union, first of all, Germany, and, on the contrary, weakens the position 
of those member states the population of which vary between 3 and 40 million 
people (first of all, Spain and Poland). Independently of the results of the 
ongoing IGC, the shift to the system of double majority seems inevitable, 
perhaps with some modification of population-membership tresholds.  
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Naturally, the European Union is not obliged to admit the countries 
of the “common periphery”. Yet the leaders of the One Europe 
should be aware of the consequences of such a political decision. As 
was the case with the Western Balkans, the strengthening of stabil-
ity, democracy and prosperity in East European countries is possible 
only in view of their prospective full institutional integration to the 
EU. Thus, the Wider Union faces the following alternative: either 
purposeful support of internal democratic and economic transforma-
tions on Ukraine, Moldova and the Transcaucasian countries with 
their further institutional and budget adjustment to “absorption” or 
consent to border on weak authoritative regimes that can pose the 
danger of potential or existing conflicts and constant “weak threats” 
for the EU. 
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